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Abstract
We show in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework
that the introduction of a common currency by a group of countries
with only partially integrated goods markets, incomplete nancial
markets and no labor migration across member states, signicantly
increases volatility of consumption and employment in the face of
asymmetric shocks. We propose a simple transfer mechanism between
member countries of the union that reduces this volatility. Further-
more, we show that this mechanism is more e¢ cient than anticyclical
policies at the national level in terms of a better stabilization for the
same budgetary e¤ects for households while in the long run deeper
integration of goods markets could reduce volatility signicantly. Re-
garding its implementation, we show that the centralized provision of
public goods and services at the level of the monetary union implies
cross-country transfers comparable to the scheme under study.
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1 Introduction
Now in its teenager years, the euro area has reached a crucial phase. The sov-
ereign debt crisis has brutally shown the limits to the economic governance
of a monetary union of heterogenous member states that have not agreed
upon a set of adequate policies that would deal with asymmetric shocks to
individual member states. For the euro area to survive it crucially matters
that new instruments are designed to address these structural aws. In the
public debate a lot has been said about the desirability of a deeper economic
union as a complement to the monetary union. However, when the debate
turns to what exactly would constitute necessary instruments and reforms,
policy makers usually add little esh to that claim. In this paper we want to
contribute to this debate over suitable institutional reforms to make the euro
area t for the future. Based on simulations in a standard open economy
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model we propose a simple trans-
fer mechanism that is suitable to address asymmetries across the monetary
union.
Our starting point is the observation that national cyclical uctuations
can turn a lot more severe when countries form a currency area whose de-
gree of economic integration, i.e. with respect to goods, labor and nancial
markets, is low1. With a common monetary policy, the volatility caused by
asymmetric shocks can no longer be mitigated by a country specic monetary
policy. The remaining options to deal with this volatility are labor migration
from depressed to booming member states and an anti-cyclical scal policy.
With insu¢ cient labor mobility across countries within the euro area the
only available option is scal policy.
All successful currency unions of heterogenous regions have common s-
cal instruments to deal with asymmetric shocks.2 These are common social
security and tax systems, common debt issuance and expenditure programs
and a creditor of last resort, the central bank3. Such a common set of instru-
ments is missing in the euro area4, so that the burden of national anti-cyclical
stabilization policies rests entirely on national budget decits and the willing-
ness of private creditors to provide credit to national governments. Monacelli
and Galí (2008) and Ferrero (2009) show that under complete nancial mar-
1This theoretical insight goes back to the original theory on optimum currency areas
of Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969) and Mundell (1973).
2See, for example Bordo et al. (2011) for a recent account.
3See de Grauwe (2011a,b) for an account of central banks acting as creditors of last
resort to governments when multiple equilibria are possible in sovereign debt markets.
4The European Union budget is currently only around 1% of GDP and expenditures
are not desigend to reduce maroeconomic volatility (see Bernoth and Engler, 2013).
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kets such policies are indeed optimal and Nakamura and Steinsson (2011)
show that scal multipliers can be expected to be quite large in such an
environment. However, the current crisis has clearly exposed the limits to
debt nancing and thereby to stabilization policies at the national level. It
therefore appears straightforward to provide instruments for stabilization at
the union level.
Within the framework of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
we propose a scal transfer mechanism as one such instrument that helps
to reduce volatility and to synchronize business cycles across countries. If
countries of a monetary union di¤er in their state of the business cycle, for
example one country growing below trend while the rest of the union growing
above trend, the poorly performing country would receive a transfer from the
booming part of the union. Thereby aggregate demand could be increased
in the rst and reduced in the second. The advantages of such a transfer
mechanism are straightforward: First, the cyclical uctuations are mitigated
in both regions. This could not be accomplished with the common monetary
policy when cycles are asymmetric. Second, if the transfers are not paid out
of national government budgets, they do not a¤ect national governments
scal positions. Thus, national scal solvency issues do not arise in times
of a severe downturn because of this mechanism. Risk premia related to
sovereign default risk will not arise and, consequently, real interest rates will
not be anticyclical as observed in the current crisis in many countries of the
euro zone. Furthermore, Ricardian equivalence e¤ects do not play any role in
our transfer mechanism which render it a much more e¤ective stabilization
tool than national decit nanced scal stabilization.
We also show that in the long-run such a transfer system might not be
needed as much as in the short-run as deeper integration reduces the asymme-
try of business cycles in the presence of asymmetric shocks. To some extent
a transfer system can thus be regarded as an instrument that is needed on
the way to a deeper union that will be in place some time in the future.
However, it is unclear that even strong policy measures fostering the further
integration of goods, services and factor markets will result in such an op-
timum currency area without a need for strong central scal institutions as
the example of the United States suggests. Deeper union in the form of a
transfer mechanism may thus be desirable in any case.
In order to derive normative conclusions, we employ a standard welfare
function and show that the transfer mechanism dominates domestic scal
stabilization policies. However, both scenarios are dominated by a exible
exchange rate regime with independent monetary policies, a result that even
a deeper degree of trade integration cannot overturn. This implies that opti-
mality of the currency area in the sense of the original literature on optimum
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currency areas of Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) can
only be established if other economic factors are taken into account that are
beyond the scope of our model framework.5
We constructed the transfer mechanism in our model in a way that it
looks very much like unemployment insurance schemes that have been up and
running in many countries for ages: Workers in a booming region transfer
resources to workers in a depressed region. As such insurance schemes work
in a quasi-automatic fashion with little delay, the well-known drawbacks of
decision and implementation lags of discretionary stabilization measures do
not apply. If set up like an insurance scheme, this would imply that the
central scal authority does not gain access to resources it can spend, it is
just a measure to re-distribute resources across the union in a well-dened,
state-contingent manner for a specic purpose that benets members in the
entire region. This may thus be a step towards political and scal union
that is politically more feasible than setting up an agency with taxing and
spending power (i.e. yielding more power to "Brussels").
However, we also analyze transfers which are implicit by the central pro-
vision of public goods on the union level. We assume that in the long-run,
all member countries pay the same fraction of their GDP to nance a union-
wide public good which is constant in its size. In the face of disturbances in
one countrys output, the resulting gap in revenues is distributed evenly over
the rest of the union. This plausible nancing scheme implies cross-country
transfers which are very close to the transfer-scheme we are considering in
this paper.
The idea of such a transfer mechanism is not new, of course. The rst
account of a scal transfer mechanism is, to the best of our knowledge, Kenen
(1969)6. More recently, Evers (2012) and, in tandemwith our work, Farhi and
Werning (2012a, b) introduced transfer schemes into DSGE models. The rst
paper compares the e¤ects of transfers related to di¤erent macroeconomic
variables in a two country model similar to ours while the second is a small
open economy model. The contribution of our analysis is to shed light on
the absence of Ricardian equivalence e¤ects under federal transfers schemes
which make them the more e¤ective tool in stabilizing economies that are
member of a currency union, a point that is also made by Farhi and Werning
(2012b). In addition, we endogenize feedback e¤ects of the rest of the union
which are mitigated by the transfer scheme and thereby provide a narrative
for a mutually benetial system of union wide transfers. Furthermore, we
5One such factor could be a boost by the euro to the welfare enhancing e¤ects of the
Common Market structure.
6See also Bean (1992).
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introduce rule of thumb consumers and discuss the role of risk premia related
to sovereign debt, two features that have not been addressed by these two
papers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the set-
up of the model and the transfer mechanism used for the positive analysis in
section 3 and the welfare analysis in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy consists of two countries which rst have independent
monetary policies and a exible exchange rate between them and then form
a currency union with a common central bank. The two-country setting
can be regarded as a short-cut to a multiple country setting as one country
will be modelled as a small economy and the second country as a large one,
which can be interpreted as an aggregate of all remaining countries. Each
country is populated by two types of households, denoted as "Ricardian" and
"rule-of-thumb" households as in Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007). The
rst type of households have access to a non-state contingent internationally
traded bond allowing them to smooth consumption across time while the
latter can consume only their current disposable income. This is motivated
by the nding of Mankiw and Campbell (1989) that aggregate consumption
is explained both by a random walk component and current income.7 They
consume domestically and foreign produced goods and supply labor in a
competitive market to domestic rms. Firms are acting in a monopolistically
competitive environment and set prices as a mark up over marginal costs.
The only input factor to production is labor so for simplicity we abstract from
investment decisions and the role of capital in production. Prices are set in a
staggered fashion à la Calvo (1983). The central banks of the two countries
before forming the monetary union implement monetary policies by setting
the short-term interest rate following a Taylor-type rule (Taylor, 1993). The
common central bank in the monetary union follows a Taylor rule with target
values that are weighted averages of member countriestarget realizations.
Fiscal policy is modelled as a constant level of aggregate government spending
while lump-sum country specic taxes and transfers across the union may or
may not react endogenously to output uctuations.
7See also Mankiw (2000) and Galí et al. (2007) and the literature surveyed therein.
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2.1 Households
The fraction (1  ) of the continuum of domestic households is populated
by Ricardian consumers (or asset-holders), and the remaining fraction 
by rule of thumbconsumers or non-asset holders. We rst describe their
decisions with respect to consumption and then with respect to labor supply.
2.1.1 Consumption decisions








to asset holders) to maximize the following lifetime utility subject to a stan-












and to the nominal period budget constraint
At+1 +Bt+1Et + PtCAt = Rt 1At +Rt 1BtEt +WtNAt +
pc
t   Tt + TrHt
where Wt denotes the economy-wide nominal wage, NAt the amount of hours
worked, pct nominal prots per capita (earned by Ricardian households only)
and Tt nominal taxes which include payments for the union-wide public good
in the respective scenario. TrHt is an income transfer between home house-
holds, to which superscript H refers, and foreign households which will be
discussed in detail below. At and Bt denote the (beginning of period) hold-
ings of bonds issued by the government of the households home country and
by the households of the other country, respectively. Et denotes the nominal
exchange rate. There are thus three distinct borrower-lender relationships:
Between domestic Ricardian households and the domestic government, be-
tween foreign Ricardian households and the foreign government and between
domestic and foreign Ricardian households.
The intertemporally optimal allocation of consumption is governed by the
























It follows that in the steady state, the returns on both bonds (i.e. Rt and
Rt ) are equal. Domestic and foreign interest rates are linked by an interest








   (exp(Bt)  1)
The risk premium,   (exp(Bt)  1), is zero for a steady state with a zero net
foreign asset position (B = 0)8 and positive for a negative net foreign asset
position (Bt < 0). As Schmidt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) have shown, this risk
premium guarantees a unique steady state. But rather than using this risk
premium just as a technical device to ensure stationarity, which is usually
done by setting  very low, in a robustness analysis we will allow it to be
"large" and we allow, in addition, the level of government debt to determine
the risk premium to show that this crucially a¤ects the relative e¤ective-
ness of national scal stabilization measures and the transfer mechanism we
propose.
Rule-of-thumb consumers (superscript N denotes non asset holders) do






t   Tt + TrHt
Rule-of-thumb households period t consumption thus simply equals their
current disposable income which is determined by wage income, transfers
and taxes9.
Both types of households consume the same bundle of goods, denoted
as Ct. This aggregate comprises two bundles CHt and C
F
t , which in turn























where !H is the steady state import share of (private) householdscon-
sumption which is subject to an exogenous zero-expectation preference shock
at which falls the AR(1)-process at = aat 1 + "t with the degree of auto-
corelation determined by a and white noise error term "t.10
To obtain symmetry of per ca-pita quantities in the steady state and at
the same time allow for home bias in consumption, we use an import share of
8This could easily be generalized to a steady state where B 6= 0.
9We calibrate the model such that consumption does not turn negative.




n for domestic households and !F = 
(1 n) for foreign households,
where n is the relative size of the two countries. That is, the import share of
either country equals the relative size of the other country scaled by the same
factor 1 6 
 6 0. A value of 
 = 1 implies the absence of home bias when
households spread their consumption evenly over the entire union, while for

 = 0 households exclusively consume domestically produced goods.
Bundles CHt and C
F



























where CHt (i) and C
F
t (i) are home and foreign produced goods of the re-
spective rm i with i 2 [0; n] denoting foreign rms and i 2 [n; 1] denoting
domestic rms.  and  are the price elasticities of substitution between
home and foreign goods and between di¤erent goods produced in the same
country, respectively. Cost minimization and aggregation across households
results in the following standard demand functions:
CHt (i) =





















where Ct = CNt + (1  )CAt is aggregate consumption, P
j
t (i) is the price
of country j rm is good in units of the domestic currency, with j 2 (H;F ).
PHt , P
F
t and Pt are the home and foreign producer price indexes and the




















































where C;Ht and C
;F
t denote the foreign householdsdemand for domestic
and foreign goods respectively. According expressions for demand and price
indices apply.
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The terms of trade are dened as the price of one unit of the foreign goods







where we made use of the assumption that the law of one price holds for
individual goods.
2.1.2 Wages and labor supply
Wages are exible so that households choose their labor supply such that their
marginal rates of substitution between labor and consumption equal the real
wage. We assume that rule-of-thumb consumers have the same functional














The two countries governments have two anti-cyclical scal stabilization
tools to deal with asymmetric shocks. The rst one is a variation in taxes at
the national level, the second one a transfer mechanism between households
in both economies.
In order to allow for purely national stabilization policies, we introduce
a taxation rule and a government budget constraint while aggregate govern-
ment spending G is assumed to be constant. Per-capita lump sum taxes Tt
are determined by the rule
Tt = G+  y








where At is the level of period t government debt and G the constant steady
state level of government spending. Y Ht and Y
n;H
t are the per capita levels of
domestic output and domestic natural output, the later being the hypothet-
ical output produced under exible prices. The di¤erence between the two is
the output gap. The coe¢ cients  j with j 2 (y; d) determine the strength of
the reaction of government revenues to changes in the level of debt and the
output gap. For anti-cyclical scal policies, we have to set  y > 0 so that
taxes are increased when the output gap is positive and that taxes fall when
it is negative. Forni and Momigliano (2004) have shown that such a rule is a
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good description of government policies in OECD countries when using real
time data11 and similar rules have been empoyed by Colciago et al. (2008).
The evolution of government debt is determined by the budget constraint
(1  )At = (1 +Rt)(1  )At 1 +G  Tt
Governments consume just their respective countrys consumption bun-
dle, we thus assume complete home bias in government purchases. The














where GHt (i) is the domestic governments period t demand for domestic









For the foreign government corresponding equations apply.
The transfer we employ in our model economy works as follows: Foreign
consumers share foreign output deviations from the respective natural levels
with domestic consumers and vice versa. The per capita transfer TrHt home
consumers receive from foreign consumers then is:
TrHt = tr
h










with tr determining the degree to which output uctuations are shared.
Transfers are zero in the steady state and, of course, we have
(1  n)TrHt + nTrFt = 0
When the home economys output relative to its natural level falls below the
foreign countrys output relative to its natural level, it receives a transfer from
the foreign country. This will boost aggregate demand in the home economy
and depress it in the foreign economy and thereby reduce both the volatility
of output and consumption and the asymmetry of the business cycles.
11The estimated rules indicate an asymmetry in that during recessions the budget decit
turns negative while there is no signicant e¤ect of a boom. In our analysis we abstract
from this asymmetry. Furthermore, Forni and Momigliano (2004) nd that with ex-post
data the state of the business cycle is not signicant any more. However, ex-post data
are not the relevant measure for an analysis of what governments actually do due to the
frequent data revisions ex-post.
10
Such a transfer mechanism has benets both from a theoretical and a
political perspective: First, as transfers are related to relative deviations from
(constrained) e¢ cient output, e¢ cient deviations from a long run trend do
not cause transfers. In our model this implies that output uctuations driven
by productivity shocks cause transfers only to the extent that the output gap
is not closed. The transfer would thus simply correct the ine¢ ciency related
to the rigidity of prices and is therefore welfare enhancing.
Second, if constructed in this way, relative deviations from the countries
respective (possibly stochastic) trend growth are the point of reference. These
transfers then would not o¤set per-capita income di¤erences and di¤erences
in trend growth. They are thus purely cyclical instruments and countries with
strong trend growth would not be "held back" by slow growth countries. This
is certainly a strong argument relevant in a political debate as the transfer
does not reduce a countrys incentive to increase its productivity and to boost
its growth trajectory.
Both the tax and the transfer rules are set up in a lump-sum fashion.
The reason why we abstract from distortionary ways of raising revenues is
that taxes and transfers would not di¤er in that respect: A euro raised would
have a distortionary e¤ect no matter whether it is used as a transfer or as a
tax. We will show below that the di¤erence between taxes and transfers is
rather whether they imply Ricardian equivalence e¤ects or not.
2.3 Aggregate demand
Aggregate demand for good i, Y Ht (i), is the sum of domestic and foreign
private and government demand:

























, one can show that








Home rm i produces output Yt (i) with the production function
Yt (i) = ZtNt (i)
 (5)
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where Nt (i) is rm is employment and where Zt is the total factor produc-
tivity that is assumed to be the same across rms and which in logs follows
the autoregressive process lnZt = Z lnZt 1 + "Zt where "
Z
t is a white-noise
shock term. The rms period t prots are
t (i) = P
H
t (i)Yt (i) WtNt (i) ;
which, when maximized, takes account of world demand (4) and the produc-
tion function (5). Assuming price setting à la Calvo, with price stickiness














is the Ricardian households discount factor
and the log-linearized optimality condition can be shown to be:
pHot = + (1  )
1X
k=0
()k Et f t+kg (6)







marginal cost function in period t + k of those rms that reset their price
in period t and that have not reset the price between t and t + k. Finally,
  log 
 1 is the optimal log price markup.
2.5 Aggregate prices and aggregate supply





   (t   )
which determines domestic ination Ht  pHt  pHt 1, is derived from equation
(6) and the expression for the evolution of the aggregate domestic price index,
pHt = p
H
t 1 + (1  )pHot














An according rule applies for the foreign central bank. After having formed
a currency union, the common central bank targets the weighted average of











We now employ this model to illustrate the di¤erent stabilization properties
of scal policy and transfers for various scenarios. In this section, we present
simple impulse responses for asymmetric demand shocks to illustrate the
mechanics of the model and briey discuss results for a productivity shock.
In section 4 we introduce a welfare metric that allows a normative comparison
of di¤erent policies for di¤erent scenarios.
The demand shock is modelled as a shock to the relative preference of
all households of the union for goods produced in the country subject to the
shock. We model this by changing the share of this countrys production in
the consumption baskets of domestic as well as of foreign households. For ex-
ample, the import share of a country subject to an adverse relative preference-
shock increases because domestic households switch to foreign goods which
they now perceive as relatively more attractive. The import share of the
foreign country decreases at the same time as foreign households switch to
products from their own country which they also perceive as relatively more
attractive. We assume that the percentage change of import-shares is of the
same magnitude in both countries but with opposed signs.
The goal is to analyse how the volatility of output and consumption and
the co-movement of these variables di¤er across scenarios and what various
stabilization policies can achieve. After presenting the calibration in section
3.1, we start with a benchmark scenario of a exible exchange rate and inde-
pendent central banks in both economies that we compare with a monetary
union benchmark setting in section 3.2. We also increase the degree of trade
integration to see whether asymmetric shocks will cause less volatility in this
setting. Then we turn to national scal stabilization policies and a trans-
fer system between the two countries under a lower degree of integration in
section 3.3. Finally we briey discuss these policies in a currency union for
a productivity shock. In section 3.4 we construct a stabilization mechanism
that allows us to prove that the transfer mechanism indeed implies a greater
bang for the buck in terms of reducing macroeconomic volatility. Lastly, we
present a version of the model with a union-wide public good the nancing of
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which allows for implicit transfers across countries when business cycles are
asymmetric in section 3.5. The idea is to illustrate one way how a transfer
mechanism could be implemented.
3.1 Calibration
The parameter values used in the simulation exercises below are summarized
in Table 1. We assume time periods to be quarters so we use the standard
value 0.99 for the discount factor , for the consumption utility function we
assume log utility, i.e.  = 1. The inverse Frisch elasticity  we set to one.
We assume that 40% of all households do not optimize intertemporally, i.e.
 = 0:4, a value that is a bit below the one found by Campbell and Mankiw
(1989). For  , the parameter determining the strength of the risk premium,
we follow Bergin (2006) who estimated it to be 0:0038. We assume relatively
short-lived shocks with a = Z = 0:9.
While we assume the home economy to make up 10 percent of the mon-
etary union, i.e. n = 0:1, private consumption has a strong home bias with
!H = 0:15 in the baseline calibration which corresponds to the fraction of
eurozone imports to GDP of several countries in the euro area. With deeper
integration we increase !H to 0.3, which Nakamura and Steinsson (2011)
found for US regions which we regard as a natural benchmark for a mone-
tary union. Concerning the import share of the foreign country, we assume
!F = !H(1 n)=n which implies symmetry of per-capita quantities between
both countries, as explained above.
We set the elasticity of substitution  to 2, a value that was also used
by Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2005). For
home and foreign government spending we assume a steady state governemnt
spending to GDP ratio G=Y of 0.2. For the government revenue equation
we set  y = 0:3 in the specication with national scal policies and zero
otherwise so that taxes inrease by 0.3 percent for an increase in GDP of one
percent while taxes react to increaes in government debt with  d = 0:1. In
the specication with the transfer scheme we set tr = 0:3 and zero otherwise.
   !H !F  1  n  
0.99 1 2 0.15 (0.3) 0.017 (0.033) 9 0.1 0.45 0.8
 Z a  G=Y  d tr;  y 
0.75 0.9 0.9 0.0038 0.2 0.1 0 (0.3) 1.5
Table 1: Parameters
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The elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the same coun-
try, , is set to 9 which corresponds to a steady state price markup of 12.5
percent. Prices are re-set on average once a year, so that  = 0:75, and the
central bank reacts to ination with the standard Taylor coce¢ cient  = 1:5.
3.2 Relative Demand Shock: Flexible Exchange Rates
and Monetary Union
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the impulse responses to a shift away from domestic
and towards foreign goods for a scenario where each country has its own
monetary policy and where both countries are linked by a exible nominal
exchange rate (lines with a cross). Furthermore, Figures 1, 2 and 3 show
results for a scenario of a xed exchange rate and a common monetary policy
(solid lines), which is the benchmark setting in our analysis. The lines marked
by circles correspond to a monetary union setting with deeper integration of
goods markets, i.e. a lower average home bias in consumption.
Under exible exchange rates, output falls due to the shock and with it
employment, real wages, marginal costs and domestic ination (not shown).
In reaction to their reduced income, rule-of-thumb consumers reduce spend-
ing, while in reaction to the reduced domestic ination, the central bank
reduces the nominal interest rate which depreciates the currency, and deteri-
orates the terms of trade. As a consequence of the decrease of the real interest
rate, Ricardian consumers increase spending which works towards stabiliz-
ing output. The strong deterioration of the terms of trade further o¤sets
the shock because the change in relative prices causes expenditure switch-
ing towards domestic goods. Thus, in equilibrium, rule-of-thumb-consumers
income is stabilized and consumption and employment move only little.
In the foreign economy two e¤ects work in opposite directions: The rela-
tive shift in favor of its products increases aggregate demand and output and
thereby employment, real wages and marginal costs. This in turn drives up
ination, the nominal and real interest rate which partially reduces aggregate
demand through a reduced consumption of foreign Ricardian households and
an improvement of the terms of trade that reduces net exports.
The net e¤ects of these adjustments is that both employment and con-
sumption in both economies is remarkably stable while aggregate output is
stabilized by the central banks by a¤ecting Ricardian householdsconsump-
tion through real interest rates (up and down, respectively) and through net
exports by quickly a¤ecting the terms of trade through the nominal exchange
rate. The reaction of the central banks and the depreciation of the currency
thus provide an e¤ective stabilization tool of aggregate consumption and
15
employment from the perspective of both economies.
Next we turn to a scenario where Home and Foreign form a monetary
union by xing the nominal exchange rate between them and setting up a
common central bank that now sets the short term interest rate as a weighted
average of the two countriesination rates. The central banks response to
the shifting in demand is now dominated by the inationary e¤ects of the
foreign economy because of the small weight of the domestic economy in the
central banks objective function. The nominal interest rate thus increases.
This implies that the real rate increases in the home economy where we have
deation (not shown) while it falls in the foreign economy (the rise in ination
dominates the increase of the nominal rate). The fact that the weak reaction
of the central bank is dominated by changes in average ination rates in both
countries exacerbates the e¤ect of the shock: In home, Ricardian consumers
reduce their consumption while they increase consumption in foreign. At
the same time, there is no change in the nominal exchange rate, the terms of
trade deteriorate a lot less so the expenditure switching e¤ect is muted as well
compared to the exible exchange rate scenario. Rule-of-thumb consumers
income thus falls which they try to o¤set by increasing their labor supply.
In the foreign economy, the lower real interest rate boosts Ricardian con-
sumers consumption (rather than reducing it as under exible exchange
rates). Consumption of rule-of-thumb households also increases due to the
rise in income. They can now a¤ord to supply less labor, as their marginal
utility of working more falls with the strong increase in consumption.
Employment and consumption are thus a lot more volatile than under
exible exchange rates in both economies. Stabilization through monetary
policy is thus a blunt tool in the presence of an asymmetric demand shock.
The two countriesbusiness cycles move a lot more in opposite directions in
response to the relative demand shock than under exible exchange rates.
However, we will see that to some extent this can be mitigated by reducing
the strong home-bias in consumption.
For that purpose, we increase the fraction of foreign produced goods in
the domestic consumption index from 0.15 to 0.3 to increase it to the US
benchmark (see Nakamura and Steinsson, 2011). We interpret this as an
increase in trade integration that may be related to the fact that the monetary
union boosts trade (the "Rose e¤ect").
The lines denoted with a circle in gures 1-3 show the results for a cur-
rency union for the scenario of deeper integration. One can see that the
impulse responses for aggregate output, consumption and employment are
in between the responses under less integrated goods markets under exible
exchange rates and under the benchmark monetary union scenario. Integra-
tion thus leads to a reduction in employment and consumption volatility in
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response to the shock in a monetary union, but it cannot fully replace the
independent monetary policies and the exible exchange rate.
The reason behind the more benign adjustment than under less integrated
goods markets is, of course, the fact that a stronger integration implies that
the impact of uctuations in consumption on output is to a higher degree
distributed over both countries. To provide comparability between both sce-
narios, the absolute change in the home bias of both countries is the same
under higher integration as in the baseline scenario.12
Policies that increase the degree of integration can thus be regarded as
important steps to build an optimum currency area.13 However, as long as
the degree of economic integration in a currency union like the euro area
is not large enough to o¤set the asymmetric e¤ects of asymmetric shocks
and since such policies are unlikely to result in a quick change of market
structures, other adjustment mechanisms are needed, at least for the time
being. We now turn to two candidates, national scal policies and the union
wide transfer mechanism.
3.3 Relative Demand Shock: National Fiscal Policies
and Transfers
An obvious candidate for a stabilization tool is national scal policies, an-
other is transfers between the two economies. We rst turn to scal policies
and then compare their e¤ectiveness with that of the transfer mechanism
introduced above. Figures 4 through 6 illustrate the impulse responses to
the relative demand shock for the monetary union benchmark scenario (solid
lines), which is the same as in gures 1-3, the scenario with national scal
policy (lines with circles) and the scenario with the transfer scheme (lines
with crosses).
As Ferrero (2009) demonstrated in his model, the optimal scal policy
at the national level within a currency area is one that allows government
budget decits to o¤set asymmetric shocks and thereby government debt
to uctuate over the business cycle. However, this optimality result was
based on the assumption of perfect capital markets. The run on government
debt markets in the recent crisis shows that there are times when such an
optimal policy stance is clearly infeasible. And even before the crisis the
12For the seminal work on the e¤ect of the degree of trade integration on the optimality
of a common currency see McKinnon (1963).
13Of course, until we havent set up a welfare function we cannot infer normative results
and thereby "optimal" policies or optimality of a currency union from this positive analysis.
Below, however, we will show that a higher volatility of employment translates into lower
welfare.
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degree of nancial market integration remained incomplete (see Lane, 2009).
Furthermore, in normal times national scal stabilization can only work to
the extent that Ricardian equivalence e¤ects are not at play.
In our model, despite the existence of rule-of-thumb-consumers, the fact
that the governmentscreditors are intertemporally optimizing households,
Ricardian equivalence e¤ects do matter. The anticipation of the long-run
consolidation of the public budged reduces the e¤ectiveness of scal policy
because the reduction of taxes is entirely nanced by credit from Ricardian
households. Because the tax reduction also applies for rule-of-thumb con-
sumers, the amount of credit given out per Ricardian household exceeds the
reduction of taxes per person. The resulting net decrease of the Ricardians
income during the time when taxes are below trend is reversed in the later
period when the government consolidates its budget, nancing the redemp-
tion of debt by above-trend taxes. This temporal uctuation of income has
a present value of zero, neglecting interest. The Ricardian household o¤-
sets the uctuation by borrowing from the foreign country when taxes are
lowered while repaying the debt when taxes are above trend level. As the
present discounted value of the tax change is zero he does not change his
consumption. This behavior of Ricardian households restricts the e¢ cacy of
scal policy to inuence aggregate demand to credit-constrained households.
However, the presence of a risk-premium gives rise to an additional mech-
anism which further impedes the e¢ cacy of this kind of scal policy. As
borrowing by Ricardian households increases due to the policy intervention,
this policy measure indirectly increases the interest rate which is a positive
function of the stock of external debt. The resulting slight decrease of con-
sumption is observed in gure 6. The increase in the perceived default risk
thus decreases the e¤ectiveness of the national anticyclical tax policy even
further.14
Taking a look at the whole picture, we observe that despite these weak-
ening mechanisms, the direct e¤ect on the consumption of rule-of-thumb
households (gure 6) leads to a reasonable amount of stabilization of aggre-
14Please notice that the reasoning of this passage does not depend on the fact that
the government nances itself exclusively via credit from domestic Ricardian households.
If governments were to sell bonds to foreign households, the scal policys e¤ect on the
Ricardian households budget would be zero in present-value terms as well. The reason
to choose the specication at hand is that if governments sell bonds only to domestic
Ricardian households, then the occurrence of the risk-premium related to private net
foreign debt is conditional on the presence of Ricardian equivalence: Government debt
is passed on to the foreign country (where it evokes the premium) just when equivalence
holds. In the alternative specication in which the government sells its bonds to foreign
households, a risk premium related to the governments net external debt would raise the
interest rate independent of the behavior of the Ricardian households.
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gate output and employment (gure 4).
A tool that is not subject to Ricardian equivalence e¤ects and resulting
risk premia is the transfer between countries introduced above. In order to
make the national scal stabilization scenario quantitatively comparable with
the scal transfer scenario, we set tr =  y = 0:3.15
After the shock, domestic households receive a transfer and one can clearly
see that both rule-of-thumb and Ricardian consumersconsumption increases
relative to the benchmark scenario. The fact that the Ricardian households
consumption reacts strongly to the transfer (when compared with the sce-
nario without transfers and compared to the scenario with taxes) is due to
the fact that these households do not regard it as temporary. Conditioning
on this specic shock it is a gift that does not have to be returned to the
donor.
Another interpretation of the transfer mechanism is that it works like an
insurance: The resources that the Ricardians regard as available are no longer
determined by the present discounted value of current and future domestic
output but rather by a weighted average of the present discounted values of
domestic and foreign output. Any asymmetric changes in output therefore
have a muted e¤ect on Ricardian householdsconsumption response.
The muted consumption responses also imply that the deviations of em-
ployment from the steady state are lower after the shock, in particular of
rule of thumb households. This result will turn out to be crucial for the
increase in welfare that will be shown below. This is a remarkable nding,
given that transfers between countries are zero in unconditional expectations
if shocks are assumed to be evenly distributed over member countries. That
is, the welfare improvement from this policy is a free lunch in the sense that
in unconditional expectations every member country is better o¤.
As the transfer mechanism is constructed as a transfer between house-
holds across the monetary union rather than between governments, it very
much mimics an unemployment insurance. An unemployment insurance has
the advantage that it acts in a quasi-automatic and immediate fashion: When
incomes fall due to temporary unemployment, households receive a transfer
without delay, thereby quickly stabilizing aggregate demand. And as un-
employment insurance schemes are only designed to support short-term or
15In the transfer-rule, parameter tr multiplies the di¤erence of output gaps in both
countries, while in the two scal rules  y multiplies the output gap of the respective
country. Albeit the di¤erences are of negligible order, we cannot claim with certainty
that the policies employed in both scenario are perfectly comparable with respect to their
budgetary e¤ect on households. In chapter 3.5, we pick up on this issue and present
a comparison which ensures that the budgetary e¤ects of both policies are absolutely
identical.
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medium-term unemployment, any increase in long-term unemployment re-
lated to a decline in trend growth is not covered. And this is exactly what
our model implies.
The alternative, a transfer between governments, would be much more
di¢ cult to implement. It would require the di¢ cult task to determine the
state of the business cycle in real time. This is di¢ cult because it is almost
impossible to di¤erentiate e¢ cient from ine¢ cient uctuations in real time.
Furthermore, transfers between governments intended to a¤ect aggregate de-
mand are likely to su¤er from the same time lags as discretionary spending
programs.
One way of interpreting the transfer mechanism is to regard the e¤ect
of the shock on the foreign economy as an externality (in this case a posi-
tive one) that the foreign economy is exposed to. The transfer ensures the
domestic economy internalizes this externality. Furthermore, the transfer is
"self-nanced" by the e¤ect of the shock on the foreign economy in that it
simply reverses the increase in output due to the shock.
3.4 Productivity shock
Figure 7-9 show the adjustment to an exogenous increase in total factor pro-
ductivity in the scenario of no policy intervention (solid lines), scal policy
as dened above (marked by circles) and the transfer scheme (marked by
crosses). First, we focus on the scenario of no policy intervention. Here two
e¤ects work in opposite directions: The increase in total factor productivity
causes a reduction of marginal costs and rms able to re-set their prices re-
duce them. In the monetary union setting, the central bank reduces its policy
rate less than neccessary to reduce the short-term real rate when the shock
occurs in a small member state. The real rate thus increases initially but
falls later on as prices return to their initial levels so that the overall e¤ect
on the long-term real rate (i.e. the cumulative short-term rates) is negative.
Ricardian householdsconsumption thus increases. However, as this increase
in demand is muted in the currency union setting (because the central bank
reduces its policy rate only slightly), the increase in Ricardiansconsump-
tion demand does not o¤set the fall in labor demand due to the increase in
productivity. The real wage and employment thus fall and consequently rule-
of thumbersconsumption which further depresses output, employment and
wages. However, a second e¤ect works against this contraction. The decrease
in marginal costs causes a decrease in domestic ination and thereby a depre-
ciation of the terms of trade. This triggers expenditure switching away from
foreign and towards domestic goods, increasing aggregate demand, output
and employment.
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Both e¤ects jointly explain the adjustment of output observed in the
gure: The adverse e¤ect caused by the rule-of-thumb consumers dominates
in the rst two periods when the impact of the shock is still strong and the
depreciation of the terms of trade has not yet accumulated to its maximum.
As time elapses, the advancement of the shocks decay reduces the strength
of the adverse e¤ect stemming from the rule-of-thumb consumers, while the
depreciation of the terms of trade further accumulates and thereby enforces
expenditure switching. Hence, the second e¤ect is dominating from period
two on, and we observe a sustained increase in output subsequent to the
initial slump.
Now we turn to the two policy measures under study, which both cause
an increase in output and thereby a reduction of the loss in employment, the
welfare-relevant variable. First notice that under exible prices, there would
be a stronger increase in output as all rms would be able to instantly lower
prices in order to induce more expenditure switching and increase output.
As both policies aim at reducing the gap to the natural allocation caused
by the price rigidity, they boost output via the reduction of taxes or by the
receipt of a transfer. From the same reasoning as in the previous section, the
output-enhancing e¤ect of scal policy is constrained by Ricardian equiva-
lence and, further limiting the policys e¢ cacy, by resulting e¤ects of the
risk premium. As these impediments to not apply for transfer payments, we
observe a stronger increment of output in the latter case, implying a better
stabilization of employment.
3.5 Comparison
In this section, we make tax- and transfer policies directly comparable by
constructing a transfer-scheme in which transfers substitute tax-policies to
an extent such that the budgetary e¤ects for households are identical for
both policy measures. Thereby we show that the substitution of national
scal policies by transfer payments o¤ers more "bang for the same buck" in
terms of stabilizing the macroeconomic environment in the monetary union.
In building the setup for this experiment, we rst slightly modify the
taxation-rules of both countries by adding the respective transfer payment.
Hence, for country H we have:
Tt = G+  y










This specication implies that cross-country transfers substitute scal pol-
icy measures. Consider e.g. a situation in which scal policy schedules an
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increase of taxes while at the same time the transfer scheme schedules the
payment of a transfer. In the policy rule at hand, the rise in Tt is reduced
by the amount of transfer-payments TrHt < 0.
The aim of this experiment is to compare the exclusive use of national
scal policies to a scenario in which national scal policies are partly sub-
stituted by cross-country transfers. The crucial step is to ensure that the
budgetary e¤ects for households are identical in both scenario. To under-
stand how we achieve this aim, consider that a cross-country transfer means
a loss for the households of the paying country and a gain for the households
of the recipient country. This means for our purpose that we have to restrict
the ow of cross-country transfers to situations in which the transfers bud-
getary e¤ects in both countries are backed by scal policy measures which
have the same budgetary e¤ect. Hence, the transfer only substitutes the tax
measure which exist in the alternative scenario and we end up with the same
budgetary positions in both countries under both scenarios. To give an ex-
ample, consider a situation in which scal rules imply tax schedules moving
in opposite direction in both countries. In such a situation, a tax increase in
one country is substituted by a payment of a transfer to the other country,
while in the other country the tax decrease is substituted by the receipt of
the transfer.
The following transfer scheme fullls the requirement of restricting trans-

































nTrFt =   (1  n)TrHt
To see how this scheme works, rst notice that the transfer is dened
in per-capita units of the home country. The related transfer in the foreign
country is governed by the second equation, taking into account di¤erent
country sizes. If a transfer occurs, it substitutes changes in taxation from
national scal policy via the last terms in the scal rules as explained above.
Now consider the transfer scheme itself: The rst term implies that a transfer
is paid out by country H (TrHt < 0) if taxes are increased in the home coun-
try (Y
 
Y Ht   Y n;H

> 0) and and the same time decreased in the foreign
country (Y
 
Y Ft   Y n;F

< 0). In this case, the inner max-function selects
the tax-variation which is smaller in absolute value (both of its arguments are
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negative), while the outer min-function has no e¤ect as the resulting value
of the inner function is negative.
Hence, country H pays a transfer in the magnitude of the weaker of the
two opposite tax-variations. This leads to a full substitution of the weaker
tax-variation: While the total e¤ect on the householdsincome remains un-
changed, this income is now paid (received) as a transfer instead of being
paid (received) as a tax variation to (from) the respective government. The
stronger of the two opposite tax-variations is partially substituted by trans-
fers, keeping the total e¤ect on the household´s income constant as well.
The second term triggers transfers paid out by country F in situations
in which national policies schedule a tax increase in country F and a tax
reduction in country H. Then the inner min-function selects the magnitude
of the smaller policy which determines the size of the transfer. It can easily
be veried that for tax changes in the same direction in both countries no
transfer occurs.
With this transfer scheme and the modied taxation-rules introduced
above, we can compare the di¤erent policies knowing that both policies bear
the very same e¤ect on the householdsincome in both countries. This prop-
erty of the comparison is crucial because it allows the following conclusion:
As shown below in the simulation exercises, the policy regime in which na-
tional policies are partly substituted by transfers achieves a higher degree of
macroeconomic stability than the scenario without transfers. Since the poli-
cies prevailing in both scenarios have exactly the same e¤ect on household
income in either country, this gain in macroeconomic stability has to be due
to a superior stabilizing e¤ect of transfers, as all things except the partial
substitution of anti-cyclical taxation are equal. In other words, one unit of
income has to have a stronger stabilizing e¤ect if it is transferred between
the countries than if it was deducted from the householdsincome via tax-
increases in the paying country and given to the household in the recipient
country via tax reductions.
We now turn to a simulation exercise for which we present the percent
reduction in employment volatility due to the partial substitution, holding
all householdsbudgetary positions constant. The simulation comprises 1000
periods and 1%-shocks to both countriesimport shares (preference shocks)
as well as 1%-shocks to both countriestotal factor productivity.1617
16The simulation is conducted using the extended-path method in Dynare. We do not
show the means under both scenarios as they are identical because of the deterministic
method.
17The reason we do not use the transfer scheme of this experiment in the welfare analysis
below is a technical one: The use of max() and min() functions requires a global deter-
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Table 2: Comparison transfer and tax policy
The volatility of employment falls in both countries if national scal poli-
cies are substituted by transfers. Unsurprisingly the reduction is considerably
larger for the small home economy. Hence, this experiment conrms the re-
duction in the volatility of employment.
3.6 Union wide public goods and implicit transfers
So far we have set up transfer schemes as explicit transfers between house-
holds. However, an important mechanism which in existing currency unions
allows for implicit transfers across regions is the changing contributions to
the provision of union-wide public goods. When a regional recession occurs,
federal tax payments fall and other regions have to bear a bigger share of
the tax burden (unless federal debt increases). In this section, we propose a
mechanism with such implicit cross-country transfers arising from the cen-
tralized provision of union wide public goods, denoted Gunion. We also sketch
a normative argument in favor of such implicit transfer from a public nance
perspective by referring to the Samuelson rule.
It is assumed that all citizens of the union consume the same constant
amount of Gunion. Concerning funding, we assume a simple taxation scheme
in which the fraction of a countrys output devoted to nance the union-wide
public good is the same for all countries in the long run. Accordingly, with our
assumption of equal per capita GDPs, the nancing scheme does not imply
long-run transfers between the regions. However, short-run uctuations of
per capita taxes give rise to transfers towards member states facing negative
shocks. The nancing scheme is governed by the following set of equations:
T union;jt = Y
j
t +Xt j 2 [H;F ]
ministic solution method which does not allow for a technically awless welfare analysis.
Hence, we only report the simulated second moments of employment under both scenarios.











Taxes paid to the union level are split into cyclical components Y jt and a
corrective term Xt which is the same for both countries. The corrective com-
ponent Xt is determined by the second equation, which ensures a balanced
budget in every period.
The tax rate  equals the share of Gunion in every countrys long-run out-
put, so that total tax revenues arising from cyclical payments of all member
states cover Gunion in the absence of shocks. Hence, we have Xt = 0 in the
steady state.
To see why this scheme implies cross-country transfers in the face of
asymmetric shocks, notice that a di¤erence in output levels implies a dif-
ference in the cyclical components of taxes paid to the union. From the
second equation, the symmetric correction term will adjust such that total
revenues received by the union remain constant. This construction gives rise
to cross-country transfers, as, for example, a positive deviation of output in
one country increases the taxes this country pays from the cyclical compo-
nent, so that the correction term turns negative for the unions budget to
remain balanced. Hence, the country facing the positive shock pays a higher
total amount of taxes for the same level of public goods, while the additional
revenues are distributed as tax-refunds in the rest of the union. Also notice
that no implicit transfers arise if both countries face the same level of output.
In the case of Y Ht = Y
F
t = Yt, the second equation implies Xt = G
union  Yt
so the correction term simply o¤sets uctuations in the cyclical components.
Hence, taxes paid by both countries remain unchanged if the shock is sym-
metric.
Figure 10 illustrates the macroeconomic implications of a partial shift
of the provision of public goods on the union level. In this gure we again
compare two scenario: In the baseline scenario of a monetary union, national
governments spend 20% of each countrys GDP to nance the provision of
national public goods (no markers). In the second scenario (marked by cir-
cles), 10% of each countrys GDP is devoted to nance the provision of a
union-wide public good, while 10% of each countrys GDP remain used for
national-wide public goods. We consider the preference shock introduced
above, that is a 1% change in import shares.
Focusing on both countriescontributions to the nancing of the union-
wide public good, we observe that taxes paid to the union decrease in the
home country and increase in the foreign country. This is of course driven by
the cyclical components Y H and Y F , because the adjustment component
is almost constant due to the symmetric e¤ect of the shock.
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The budgetary e¤ects of this nancing scheme closely mimics the transfer
scheme studied in this paper: The country subject to a adverse shock enjoys
a tax-reduction nanced by the country which is in a more favorable position.
Furthermore, uctuations of each countrys contribution is zero in expecta-
tions, so there is no transfer of resources in the long run. The stabilizing
e¤ect induced by this nancing scheme is not limited to rule-of-thumb con-
sumers, because there is not Ricardian equivalence as a transfer of resources
does not bring about a reallocation in the reverse direction in the future.
Hence, the shift of the provision on public goods on the union level has the
very same macroeconomic implications as the setup of the proposed transfer
scheme. In the gure, we observe a considerable stabilization in output, con-
sumption and employment in either country. Behind this e¤ect is the same
reasoning as the stabilization provided by the transfer scheme discussed in
the previous chapter. Unsurprisingly, the gain in macroeconomic stability
implies a gain in welfare, as shown in the next chapter.
It is easy to make the normative case for such implicit transfers by alluding
to the Samuelson rule (Samuelson, 1954). The Samuelson rule states that
the sum of marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the
private good of all households in the union has to equal the relative price of
the public good. The constant level of the public good implies a constant
level of marginal utility of consuming it across the union. In a regional
recession, the marginal rate of substitution falls in that region (because of a
fall in consumption) and, given convex marginal utilities of consumption, an
optimal tax scheme would imply a reduced taxation in that region and an
increased taxation in the other regions in order to return to an optimum.
4 Welfare Analysis
In order to compare the di¤erent scenarios of sections 3.2-3.4 and 3.6 in their
e¤ect on the countrieswelfare, we employ the following welfare function
WHt that is a weighted average of the Ricardian households intertemporal




















We thus assume that the rule-of-thumb consumers consumption and em-
ployment can be evaluated from an intertemporal perspective even though
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they do not use this perspective for their consumption choice. For the foreign
economy an according welfare function applies.
In the appendix we show that when employing a second order approxima-
tion to WHt , one can express the welfare loss of business cycle uctuations,
expressed as a fraction of steady state consumption, as a function of the
weighted unconditional variances of employment18:










for  = 1. The relative welfare gain (in percent) of moving from the bench-
















(1  )V arj (NAt ) + V arj (NNt )
  1
where Vari (Nt) with i 2 (1; 2; 3; 4) is the variance of employment under sce-
nario i and index j stands for the benchmark scenario. Table 3 presents
these gains relative to the benchmark currency union scenario for the sce-
narios shown in section 3 (note that a negative sign indicates a welfare gain
compared to the benchmark because volatility falls for higher welfare levels):
it
Scenario
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2),(3), (5)
Type of Country Fl. Ex. Deeper Fisc. Transfer (4) Publ.
shock Rate Integr. Policy Goods
De- H -97 -61 -31 -45 -79 -18
mand F -100 -60 -40 -40 -80 -20
Produc- H -91 -52 -36 -51 -64 -4
tivity F -48 -20 -21 -19 -46 -1
Table 3: Welfare gains compared to currency union benchmark (in %)
18The variance of consumption drops out of this expression for the special case of log
utility.
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The welfare e¤ects were computed for both the domestic and the foreign
economy by running simulations over 100000 periods for the two shocks sep-
arately but for both countries a¤ected by country specic shocks. Table 3
tells the same story as the impulse response functions presented above: The
benchmark currency union incurs signicant welfare costs in terms of em-
ployment volatility both when compared to a exible exchange rate scenario
and when compared to a currency union with a high degree of goods mar-
ket integration, scal stabilization and scal transfers. The biggest welfare
gains within the currency union arrangement are to be expected from a deep-
ened integration of goods markets while a system of transfers allows much
larger gains compared to scal stabilization at the national level. Lastly,
when deeper integration is combined with national scal stabilization and
the transfer mechanism, welfare in the monetary union increases further but
never reaches welfare under exible exchange rates.
Turning to the di¤erences between the shocks, one can clearly see that for
the demand shock, the transfer mechanism clearly dominates the tax policy
when the goal is to maximize welfare, i.e. minimize employment volatility.
Welfare is clearly higher for the small domestic economy while it is at the
same level in the foreign economy. In contrast, for the productivity shock
the transfer dominates only for the small domestic economy, the large foreign
economy is worse o¤. However, as is well-known from the empirical New
Keynesian literature (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003), the demand shock
is of much bigger importance for overall volatility in the euro area so that a
transfer is likely to be a necessary instrument to reduce overall volatility and
increase overall welfare.
In light of these results one can certainly ask why one should not simply
abandon the monetary union and return to a world of exible exchange rates
which obviously delivers the highest levels of welfare. But one should not
forget that we focused on only one aspect of monetary integration, volatility,
which has to be assessed jointly with other aspects. One such aspect could
be a boost to growth that we cannot adress in our framework.
5 Conclusion
We show that a currency union formed by economies that are not perfectly
integrated may experience large volatility and asymmetric business cycles
when these economies are hit by asymmetric shocks. We propose a transfer
mechanism between the members of the union that can o¤set these asym-
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metric e¤ects and argue that this might be a policy option until deeper trade
(and possibly nancial and labor market) integration is accomplished. Fur-
thermore, we show that such a transfer mechanism is more e¤ective than
scal stabilization measures at the national level as Ricardian equivalence
e¤ects and risk premia do not arise. Lastly, we show that such transfers
increase welfare more than scal stabilization.
The mechanism looks very much like an insurance scheme that o¤sets the
e¤ects on consumption caused by deviations of output from trend relative to
other member economiesoutput deviations from trend. When one country
booms while another country contracts, a transfer from the booming to the
depressed country sets in. Under the assumption of these asymmetric shocks
being equally and identically distributed across countries, the net-payments
over time will be zero. There is thus no permanent transfer between countries.
The euro area, which is clearly in need for new business cycle stabilization
tools but which lacks strong support for deeper political union with a Euro-
pean authority equipped with spending and taxing powers that might be used
as a stabilization tools at the national level, this last aspect might make it
politically implementable: When the mechanism implies no net transfers on
average over time, but a reduced volatility of employment and consumption,
everyone is better o¤. On average, no money is transferred to Brusselsby
richer economies.
One obvious candidate for a real world equivalent of such a mechanism is
an unemployment scheme that re-distributes resources across the monetary
union. Another, politically more ambitious, candidate is the provision of
union wide public goods. We present a variant of the model with taxation
rules related to the relative state of the business cycle for nancing union wide
public goods that allow for implicit transfers across countries and which also
have very benecial welfare e¤ects.
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A utility function U(Ct; Nt), when aproximated up to second order around
the deterministic steady state, can be written as




















Making use of the second order Taylor approximation Xt X
X
= bxt + 12bx2t and
re-arranging, we get
U(Ct; Nt)  U(C;N) = UCC
0@ bct + 12 1 + UCCCUC bc2t
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where we neglected terms of an order higher than two. For log utility in
consumption and U(N) =  N1+
1+
this reduces to
U(Ct; Nt)  U(C;N) =
bct  N1+bnt + 1
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(1 + 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Plugging this into equation (7) we get
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Taking the limit  ! 1, we can express the welfare measure in terms of
employment variances,
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which, when noting that V ar
 bnAt  = V ar(Nt)N2 , can be re-written in terms the
employment volatility in levels,















































































Figure 1: Demand shock, aggregate variables I. Solid line: MU benchmark;
Circles: MU with deeper integration; Crosses: Flexible exchange rate
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Figure 2: Demand shock, aggregate variables II. Solid line: MU benchmark;
Circles: MU with deeper integration; Crosses: Flexible exchange rate
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Figure 3: Demand shock, disaggregated variables. Solid line: MU bench-
mark; Circles: MU with deeper integration; Crosses: Flexible exchange rate
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Figure 4: Demand shock, aggregate variables I. Solid line: MU benchmark;
Circles: Tax policy; Crosses: Transfers
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Figure 5: Demand shock, aggregate variables II. Solid line: MU benchmark;
Circles: Tax policy; Crosses: Transfers
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Figure 6: Demand shock, disaggregated variables. Solid line: MU bench-
mark; Circles: Tax policy; Crosses: Transfers
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Figure 7: TFP shock, aggregate variables I. Solid line: MU benchmark; Cir-
cles: Tax policy; Crosses: Transfers
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Figure 8: TFP shock, aggregate variables II. Solid line: MU benchmark;
Circles: Tax policy; Crosses: Transfers
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Figure 9: TFP shock, disaggregated variables. Solid line: MU benchmark;
Circles: Tax policy; Crosses: Transfers
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Figure 10: Union-wide public goods versus national public goods. Solid lines:
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